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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A careful review of the Appellant's Brief would indi-
cate the painstaking process taken of reviewing the trial 
record and the Court transcript for proper citation to 
evidence presented in order to substantiate the evidentiary 
facts set forth in the Appellant's Brief. 
A review of the Respondent's Statement of Facts in 
several instances would indicate paragraphs of purported 
evidentiary facts which are totally unsupported by citation 
to the trial record or the trial transcript. This Court ir 
the event of discrepancies in the facts as set forth between 
the Appellant's and Rerpondent's Statement of Facts should 
lend greater credence to the version support by citation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Trial Court did abuse its discretion in 
failing to properly consider certain marital assets as set 
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forth and in awarding to the Respondent in essence a part of 
the Appellant's inheritance. 
2. The Trial Court abused its discretion in the 
amount of alimony award to the Appellant. 
3. The Trial Court abused its discretion in the award 
of an interest of the Respondent in Appellantfs inheritance. 
4. The Trial Court abused its discretion in failing 
to enter proper and equitable Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER AND ENTER A 
FINDING IN REGARDS TO THE RESPONDENT'S 
SURVIVOR ANNUITY BENEFITS AND RETIREMENT 
AS PERSONAL PROPERTY ASSETS ACQUIRED 
DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
The Respondent, again without resitation to the trial 
record or the trial transcript, would imply that the Trial 
Court did properly take into consideration in its division 
of property between the parties, the fact that the Respon-
dent did have a survivor annuity benefit acquired during 
this 42 year marriage. 
As stated in Appellant's Brief, the Trial Court failed 
to enter a finding or a conclusion of law in regards to an 
award or a consideration of the Respondent's survivor 
annuity benefit. The Respondent correctly indicates it is 
an insurance policy and if the Respondent were to die his 
designated survivor would receive an annuity in the form of 
a portion of his retirement. This annuity, after 42 years 
of marriage, should be awarded to the Appellant. The Trial 
Court abused its discretion in not entering a finding as to 
the annuity and in failing to award the survivor annuity 
benefit to the Appellant. 
The Trial Court did abuse its discretion in failing to 
consider the Respondent's retirement as a marital asset. It 
did address the retirement as income due to the Respondent, 
but there was no award of that retirement benefit as person-
al property accumulated during 42 years of marriage. The 
Trial Court simply considered the retirement as income and 
awarded to the Appellant alimony of $300.00 per month which 
would automatically terminate upon remarriage, cohabitation 
or the Appellant's death. The property was incorrectly 
considered as income rather than a marital asset and the 
Trial Court abused its discretion in so considering it under 
Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1987}. 
POINT 11. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ONLY AWARDING THE SUM OF $300.00 PER 
MONTH AS AND FOR ALIMONY. 
In response to the Respondent's Brief on alimony, 
Appellant would simply refer this Court to the Appellant's 
_ - } _ 
Argument under its Point II, that in consideration of the 
property division, (which is inequitable as argued in the 
previous Points in Appellant's Brief), and the failure by 
the Trial Court to make proper findings under Stevens v. 
Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988), and Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 97 (Utah 1986), that this Court should 
reconsider by its own authority the alimony award or remand 
to the Trial Court for further consideration and further 
entry of Findings of Fact as to the Appellant's ability to 
provide sufficient income for herself and for reconsid-
eration of the property distribution as affecting the 
alimony award, 
POINT III, 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT AN INTEREST 
IN THE APPELL/iNT1 S LIENS ON HER INHERIT-
ED PROPERTY. 
Respondent's Point III with only one citation to case 
law sets forth a barrage of unsupport factual evidence 
indicating that the income including the inheritance of the 
Appellant's was the Appellant's while any income of the 
Respondent's was also the Appellant's. The Trial Court 
found that the Appellant became employed with the Respondent 
paying all of their living expense but that the Appellant 
spent her money as she pleased with her money with an offset 
by the Respondent's use of the watch repair money for his 
private use. Regardless, the Respondent is asking the Court 
to penalize in effect, the Appellant, and admittedly award 
to the Appellant less than her one-half interest in the 
marital assets due to her inheritance in 1968 and 1972. 
This inheritance was wisely invested by the Appellant to 
produce an increase as testified to by both the Appellant 
and the Respondent and that at no time did the Appellant 
co-mingle but in fact continually maintained as separate the 
inheritance and the monies earned thereby. The Respondent 
would seem to imply that the Appellant is only entitled to 
her one-half of the assets acquired during the marriage if 
the Appellant simply maintained the $71,000.00 in some kind 
of a savings account or Certificate of Deposit rather than 
vigorously investing that inheritance in stocks, bonds, or 
other types of investments that allowed a greater increase. 
As argued earlier in Appellant's Brief, there was a 
failure of the Trial Court to consider several of the 
marital assets in its "equitable" division of property and 
as argued earlier in Appellant's Brief, the Trial Court did 
abuse its discretion in awarding to the Respondent, in 
effect, an interest in the Appellant!s inheritance and gain 
therefrom. 
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The Appellant worked from the mid 1960fs on as admitted 
by the Respondent, working part-time and then full-time at 
Whitehead Electric, contributing to the upkeep of the home, 
making improvements to the home and in purchasing furniture 
for the home. (Ironically, Respondent was awarded full 
interest in that home.) 
The Respondent's statements that the Appellant had 
acquired or amassed assets in the sum of $195,340.00 as 
compared to the Respondent's savings of $28,000.00 is not 
only unfounded but misleading. Seventy-one thousand dollars 
($71,000.00) of the $195,000.00 was an inheritance acquired 
more than 14 years ago, a base from which the Appellant 
wisely invested the monies to allow an increase and which 
came only as a result of a death of her parents and which 
monies were never co-mingled but maintained separate and 
apart from marital funds. 
The Respondent is requesting that the Appellant be 
penalized for maintaining her sole inheritance as a separate 
property by following law as spelled out in Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 204 (Utah 1988), rather than co-mingling 
the properties. Respondent advocates that due to her 
refusal to co-mingle, Appellant should not receive her half 
of the marital estate. 
The Court abused its discretion in failing to consider 
several of the marital assets and in awarding to the Respon-
dent a portion of the Appellant1s inheritance. 
POINT IV. 
THE APPELLANT HAS PREVAILED IN SHOWING 
IN HER ARGUMENTS THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD SUBSTITUTE A JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF 
THE TRIAL COURT OR REMAND FOR APPROPRI-
ATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW. 
The Respondent refers to the pre-trial finding by 
Commissioner Richards as an evidentiary hearing with a 
conclusion entered by a finder of fact as lending some 
further credibility and viability to the ultimate decision 
entered by Judge Stanton M. Taylor, the trial Judge. Case 
law as well as a review of the statutes clearly indicate 
that the Commissioner sitting for 30 minutes in a pre-trial 
settlement conference is not a finder of fact as witnesses 
are not sworn, testimony is not taken from sworn witnesses, 
and testimony is only proffered by the parties1 attorneys. 
A Commissioner in this sense is not a finder of fact and 
cannot be considered so where testimonies are not given frcm 
sworn witnesses nor from the parties. No further credibil-
ity should be given to Judge Stanton M. Taylor's decision 
because Commissioner Richards in a preliminary type hearing 
made similar recommendations. The Trial Court is still 
under the obligation to enter sufficient Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as cited in earlier cases and to 
enter an equitable division of the marital property of the 
parties in consideration of earlier cited cases, in particu-
lar Mortensen v. Mortensen, supra. 
This Court should not substitute its judgment for that 
of the finder of fact unless it is apparent that the finder 
of fact abused its discretion by either not following the 
law or by making an interpretation of fact that is simply 
not supported. A careful review of the arguments of the 
Appellant would indicate that there has been an abuse of 
discretion in failing to enter and consider certain factors 
critical in making an equitable distribution of the marital 
assets and the case should either be remanded for further 
findings, further consideration or this Court should use its 
authority to correct the decision of the trial Judge. 
The Respondent in the case that the Appellant does not 
agree with the decision because it attempts to equalize her 
financial position without that of her husband. As the 
facts indicate under the testimony, the financial position 
of the parties was not equal nor should it be made so. The 
Appellant inherited without any act of the Respondent's, and 
as case law allows, she maintained separate and apart from 
the marital assets the sum of approximately $71,000.00 which 
increased in value due to her efforts. Immediately upon the 
inheritance and thereafter due to the growth in the inheri-
tance monies and a failure of squandering those funds, the 
positions financially of the parties were not, nor would the 
be, in an equal position, and if the Court was and apparent-
ly is, attempting to equalize their positions, that is 
clearly an abuse of discretion under Mortensen and the other 
inheritance cases cited and referred to. There is no 
manifestation of greed on behalf of the Appellant but a 
request that she not be penalized due to the inheritance 
that she received from her parents which she meticulous." v 
labored in maintaining in separate and apart from marital 
assets and refused to co-mingle. 
Although the Trial Court in domestic proceedings cannot 
give back the peoples lives in this case nor can they alter 
concepts, perceived ideas nor living habits, the Court can 
do equity in awarding to the parties, or at least forcing 
the Trial' Court to enter sufficient findings of Fact co 
allow this Court to make a determination as to why inheri-
tance not co-mingled and considered solely and asset of the 
Appellant should partially be awarded to the Respondent in 
giving less than an equal share of the marital assets to the 
Appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Respondent in its Reply Brief has not raised any 
sustainable objections or challenges to the Appellant!s 
Brief but has simply relied on a contortion and melodramatic 
presentation of the facts in an attempt to convince this 
Court that due to the meticulous care of an inheritance the 
Appellant should penalized in receiving less than her equal 
share of the marital assets or even a consideration of how 
those assets were considered in the "equitable" division of 
properties• 
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